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Most social dilemma studies of communication’s effects on cooperation are based on labo-
ratory results with trivial incentives. Studies of real-life social dilemmas with nontrivial
rewards are needed to extend the generality of laboratory results. Perceptions of cooperation
on a group product (weekly group essay) were examined as a public goods dilemma embed-
ded in a longitudinal study of groups using either face-to-face or computer-mediated com-
munication. Perceptions of cooperation increased over time, whereas measures of group
identity did not. No media effect on perceptions of cooperation was observed. Several predic-
tors of late perceptions of cooperation were examined, but only early perception of coopera-
tion was significant. Results are discussed with respect to several current hypotheses regard-
ing communication and cooperation in social dilemmas.
Much of the study of interpersonal cooperation has been done in
the context of social dilemmas. These are situations in which each
group member receives a higher pay-off for a noncooperative
choice (defection) than a cooperative choice no matter what other
members do, but all members are better off if all cooperate than if
all defect (Dawes, 1980; van Lange, Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke,
1992). One robust finding from that work is that cooperation
increases in groups who discuss the dilemma face-to-face before
507
AUTHOR’S NOTE: The research on which this article is based was supported in part by
National Science Foundation grant IRI93-10099 (J. E. McGrath, principal investigator). I
thank Holly Arrow, Jennifer L. Berdahl, Linda Lebie, Joseph E. McGrath, Kathleen
O’Connor, and Jonathan A. Rhoades, who planned and conducted the workshop study on
which this article is based. I also thank Martha Orland and others involved in data collection
and processing. I thank Norbert L. Kerr, Samuel S. Komorita, Joseph E. McGrath, Kathleen
M. O’Connor, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts. An earlier
version of this article was presented at the 1995 meeting of the Midwestern Psychological
SMALL GROUP RESEARCH, Vol. 31 No. 5,  October 2000 507-527
© 2000 Sage Publications, Inc.
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016sgr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
making individual choices (Komorita & Parks, 1995; Messick &
Brewer, 1983). Research to understand that relation has centered on
two main hypotheses: (a) that increased cooperation following dis-
cussion arises because of an increase in group identity (Brewer &
Kramer, 1986) and (b) that increased cooperation following discus-
sion arises because of commitments to cooperate made during dis-
cussion (Kerr, Garst, Lewandowski, & Harris, 1997; Orbell, van de
Kragt, & Dawes, 1988).
Recent research suggests that commitments to cooperate may be
the primary factor underlying increased cooperation after discus-
sion. However, the bulk of that research—showing discussion’s
impact or testing either of the hypothesized causes—has been done
with social dilemmas created in laboratories. Such situations differ
in at least four important ways from real-life social dilemmas.
Those differences, discussed extensively next, are such that they
raise doubts as to the generality of the findings that commitment
(not group identity) may be responsible for discussion’s effect.
This study examines social dilemmas in more realistic conditions
and thereby tests the generality of findings about discus-
sion-induced cooperation.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LABORATORY
AND REAL-LIFE SOCIAL DILEMMAS
Whereas numerous differences exist between laboratory and
real-life social dilemmas, four main distinctions are relevant to the
present study. First, the incentive to cooperate or defect in labora-
tory social dilemma investigations of the discussion effect (Orbell
et al., 1988) may be very weak. Participants often play for very
small economic incentives (Ostrom & Walker, 1991) and in some
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cases even for lottery tickets rather than actual money (Bouas &
Komorita, 1996). Although laboratory situations capture the
essence of the dilemma, participants in such situations may not be
economically self-motivated to the degree they might be in real-
world social dilemmas and thus are more responsive to experimen-
tal manipulations.
A second difference between laboratory and real-life social di-
lemma studies of the discussion effect has to do with communication.
In laboratory situations, communication is controlled. Participants
are told what topic to discuss, how long to discuss it, and what com-
munication medium to use. In real-life social dilemmas, communi-
cation is almost always less constrained. People in more realistic
dilemmas may discuss any topic using any available communica-
tion medium (e.g., e-mail and online computer-mediated com-
munication). Because nearly all research on discussion-induced
cooperation to date has been conducted in laboratory settings, it is
reasonable to ask if results from those studies will generalize to
more realistic settings. In addition, research on the effect of com-
munication medium in a social dilemma is almost nonexistent (for
an exception, see Kiesler, Sproull, & Waters, 1996) and deserves
attention as well.
A third major difference between laboratory and real-life social
dilemma investigations is the meaning of time. Several social
dilemma experiments have used one-shot choice designs to investi-
gate a manipulation’s impact on cooperation (Braver & Wilson,
1986). Other social dilemma experiments require participants to
make a series of choices (Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994).
Regardless of whether a single choice or choices over trial blocks
are analyzed, most social dilemma experiments are conducted
within the context of the experimental hour. Laboratory results sug-
gest that cooperation decreases over time (Isaac & Walker, 1988;
Komorita, Parks, & Hulbert, 1992; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965).
In real life, social dilemmas typically unfold over much longer peri-
ods. For example, a team evaluated and rewarded based on perfor-
mance on a group product is essentially experiencing a real-life
public goods dilemma that continues for however long the team
remains intact, a time period that could involve years of interdepen-
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dence. Studying real-life social dilemmas requires considering
time more broadly.
Finally, the fourth difference between laboratory and real-life
social dilemmas involves what is meant by cooperation. Coopera-
tion has a specific meaning determined by the experimental task
used in laboratory social dilemmas. In such situations, nothing is
subjective about determining whether a group member has cooper-
ated. Once the choices are made, one knows who has cooperated.
Yet, real-life social dilemmas rarely have such clear-cut distinc-
tions between cooperation and defection. Rather, people experi-
encing real-life dilemmas—such as the organizational team
described earlier—rely on perceptions of cooperation to guide
their behavior. Cooperation may be objective in the laboratory, but
in real-life dilemmas, it is experienced subjectively. It is clear that
expectations of cooperation do influence choice in laboratory
social dilemmas (Bouas & Komorita, 1996), a finding that suggests
perceptions of cooperation should influence the development of
cooperation in longer term, real-world social dilemmas.
Given these four differences, it is possible that experimental
results relevant to communication in social dilemmas may not gen-
eralize to more realistic settings. The primary conclusions of the lit-
erature regarding discussion-induced cooperation are discussed in
the context of real-life social dilemmas next.
LABORATORY RESULTS AND THE QUESTION OF GENERALITY
The group identity explanation. Conceptualizations of group
identity have been based in social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979)
and social categorization (Turner, 1985) theories. One of social
identity’s main tenets is a positive relationship between group iden-
tity and intergroup differentiation (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Kelly,
1988). This relationship is suggested to cause in-group bias
(Brewer, 1979; Rabbie, 1982). Research that supports this relation-
ship has shifted the emphasis of in-group bias from negative conse-
quences of out-group perceptions to positive consequences of
group identity and hence higher levels of in-group cooperation over
time.
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Group identity is hypothesized to cause group members to be
more concerned with the outcomes of their fellow group members
than their own outcomes (Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994). Once
identification is evoked, cooperative behavior should follow
because of the reordering of priorities. In an early study of discus-
sion’s effects, Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977) compared
four conditions varying in type of communication: (a) no commu-
nication, (b) group discussion of an irrelevant issue, (c) group dis-
cussion on the dilemma, and (d) group discussion on the dilemma
plus nonbinding roll call of intentions. Decisions on the dilemma
were made anonymously, and results showed a large difference in
cooperation rates for Conditions B and C (35% and 74%, respec-
tively). Dawes et al.’s explanation for this result suggests that only
discussion of the dilemma evoked group identity and that group
identity made members choose to cooperate. Unfortunately, the
study did not provide an independent measure of group identity,
and conclusions regarding its role in discussion-induced coopera-
tion are tentative.
Brewer and Kramer (1986) and Kramer and Brewer (1984)
argued that group identity occurs if members believe they are all
recipients of a common fate rather than if they experience events
individually. Brewer and Kramer (1986) manipulated common fate
by leading participants to believe a single lottery would determine
the amount that all would be paid per point earned in a social
dilemma situation. Thus, all participants shared the same fate.
Results of both studies indicated common fate groups reported
higher group identity than control groups and individuals behaved
more cooperatively when a collective group identity was salient.
Both Dawes et al. (1977) and Brewer and Kramer’s (1986;
Kramer & Brewer, 1984) work investigated the group identity
explanation without testing it against the commitment explanation.
Later laboratory studies focused more on testing the group identity
against the commitment explanation of discussion-induced
cooperation.
The commitment explanation. In an extension of Dawes et al.’s
(1977) work, van de Kragt, Orbell, and Dawes (1983) allowed some
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participants to discuss a public goods dilemma prior to making
their choice, whereas others were not allowed to communicate.
Participants discussing the dilemma designated a minimal contrib-
uting set so the public good could be provided at minimum cost.
Van de Kragt et al. hypothesized that a social contract is defined
during discussion, causing group members to feel obliged to adhere
to designated roles. Consistent with this explanation, Orbell et al.
(1988) found that commitments to cooperate made during discus-
sion increased cooperation only when all group members promised
to cooperate. Other research (Braver & Wilson, 1986; Chen, 1996;
Chen & Komorita, 1994) also supports the commitment explanation.
Compelling evidence supporting a commitment explanation
came from Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland (1994) in a critical test of
the group identity and commitment explanations. Kerr and
Kaufman-Gilliland argued that if the group identity explanation is
correct, collective welfare should be more important to the individ-
ual and a nonefficacious cooperative act is unlikely as it will not
enhance collective welfare. Alternatively, if the commitment
explanation is correct, the efficacy of the act should not matter.
As expected based on the commitment explanation, participants in
a public goods dilemma made cooperative choices even in low-
efficacy conditions. In addition, an independent measure of group
identity (Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone, & Crook, 1989) allowed
the authors to remove group identity in a covariance analysis, yet
the discussion effect remained.
Finally, Bouas and Komorita (1996) used a design similar to
Dawes et al. (1977) but included the Hinkle et al. (1989) measure of
group identity. In a competitive test of the group identity and com-
mitment explanations, Bouas and Komorita found that cooperation
increased only in conditions in which the dilemma was discussed
(the only conditions in which commitments to cooperate are possi-
ble). Group identity was high in conditions where any face-to-face
discussion (on the dilemma or not) occurred. In a series of regres-
sion analyses, Bouas and Komorita found the expectation that other
group members would cooperate was the most important factor in
explaining the variance in choice behavior. Assuming this expec-
tancy arose from commitments made during group discussion of
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the dilemma, this result supports the commitment explanation and
contradicts Dawes et al.’s earlier conclusion that only discussion of
the dilemma evokes group identity.
In sum, evidence suggests group identity could contribute to dis-
cussion’s influence on cooperation; however, the studies employ-
ing competitive tests of both explanations suggest the commitment
explanation is the dominant mechanism underlying the discussion
effect. Whether this conclusion generalizes beyond laboratory set-
tings requires further empirical work.
Generalizing to more real-life social dilemmas. Does commit-
ment increase cooperation in more real-life social dilemma set-
tings? Or, is group identity a reasonable explanation in those con-
texts? In real groups, strong interpersonal bonds that may be
associated with group identity should take time to develop (Hill &
Gruner, 1973; Maples, 1988; Tuckman & Jensen, 1977). Real
group members (rather than ad hoc groups in laboratory studies)
should experience a much stronger version of group identity than is
possible in any one-shot laboratory setting. The group identity
explanation may be more likely to find support in real-life social
dilemma settings than in laboratory ones. If it does not, we would
have even stronger evidence that group identity is not the driving
force behind discussion-induced cooperation.
The impact of communication media on cooperation should also
be of interest in real-world social dilemmas. The communication
medium that group members use may either inhibit or foster the
development of group identity. Because computer-mediated com-
munication (CMC) lacks the rich interpersonal cues present in
face-to-face (FTF) interaction (Daft & Lengel, 1986), CMC groups
may not experience group identity to the extent FTF groups do. If
group identity is inhibited by use of CMC and if group identity is an
important mechanism underlying cooperation in natural groups,
then CMC groups may report less cooperation than groups working
FTF. If a group identity is not critical for cooperation in natural
groups—as the commitment explanation argues—then a finding of
no media differences in cooperation would bolster existing litera-
ture that supports the commitment explanation.
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Few studies have examined the impact of communication
medium on choice in social dilemmas. Although some research
demonstrated medium effects in mixed-motive tasks generally
(O’Connor, Gruenfeld, & McGrath, 1993), Kiesler et al. (1996)
found participants in a laboratory social dilemma cooperated
equally with a text-only computer and a confederate but less with a
humanlike computer. Given the similarity of a text-only computer
to the experience of synchronous CMC, it may be reasonable to
expect no effect of medium on cooperation.
Other laboratory results would be of interest to examine in more
real-life social dilemma situations. One previously mentioned find-
ing was that cooperation in laboratory social dilemmas almost
always decreases over time. In more realistic longitudinal social
dilemmas, should this effect replicate? If group identity is a viable
mechanism behind cooperation in real-world social dilemmas, then
it may well be that if group identity invariably develops with longer
time periods experienced by natural groups, corresponding
increases in cooperation may be observed.
OVERVIEW
The earlier discussion outlines several distinctions between lab-
oratory and real-life social dilemma situations, focusing on
research addressing the discussion effect. The differences point to
ways in which laboratory research may not easily generalize to
more realistic social dilemmas. The present study constitutes a first
step toward examining these issues outside of a laboratory setting.
The study is explicitly exploratory in nature given the paucity of
research that focuses on generalizing laboratory social dilemma
studies of the discussion effect to other contexts. However, two
competing hypotheses based on the previous discussion will guide
the analyses:
Hypothesis 1: If social dilemma findings are correct, then early levels
of group identity should be unrelated to later measures of coopera-
tion, but early expectations of cooperation should predict later mea-
sures of cooperation. Furthermore, no difference in cooperation or
group identity should be observed in FTF versus CMC groups.
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Hypothesis 2: If group identity is a more viable explanation of commu-
nication’s effects in real-life social dilemma situations, group iden-
tity should increase over time and cooperation should also increase.
FTF groups should experience greater group identity and, conse-
quently, cooperation than groups using CMC groups.
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN
One hundred nineteen undergraduates enrolled in an organiza-
tional psychology course participated. Participants actively applied
text and lecture material in a required weekly workshop in which
the study took place. The present study employed a 2 (computer-
mediated vs. face-to-face communication) × 2 (early: Weeks 2
through 4 vs. late: Weeks 5 through 7) design with repeated mea-
sures on the second factor. Week 1 was not included inasmuch as a
public goods dilemma did not occur that week.
PROCEDURE
Participants met in three- or four-person groups once a week for
7 weeks in a 2-hour workshop. Groups met in either FTF or CMC
conditions. Group members worked on an individual task and then
collaborated on a solution to the task they had worked on individu-
ally. The specific nature of the weekly tasks is described in
McGrath and Arrow (1996), but all tasks required students to apply
course material to an organizational consulting problem. After
completing the task, participants completed a posttask question-
naire assessing feelings toward and perceptions of the group, the
group’s task performance, and the task itself.
Next, participants wrote individual essays relating the consult-
ing task to the course material. Individual essays were always fol-
lowed by a group essay in which participants collaborated on an
identical assignment. After the group essay, participants filled out a
postessay questionnaire assessing perceptions of contribution lev-
els toward the group essay. Individual and group essay scores were
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part of participants’ course grades. The only variant on this
occurred during Week 1 in which no essays were written because
there had not been enough course content presented for participants
to complete the assignment. Groups were dissolved at the end of
Week 7.
The group essay can be construed as a real-life public goods
dilemma. It would be easy for a group member to withhold his or
her contribution to the creation of the essay and free-ride to a good
grade. However, if all members did this, then the group essay’s
quality would decline, leading to a poor grade, and all would be
worse off than if all had contributed. In this study, cooperation was
assessed by participants’ perceptions of contribution to the group
essay.
Measures of cooperation. Measures of contribution to group
essays were taken from the postessay questionnaire. Participants
rated their own and each other’s amount of contribution to the
group essay, the value of those contributions, the amount of effort
put forth, and the number of ideas generated. The ratings of the first
three measures were on a 7-point scale with 1 indicating the least
amount of contribution, lowest value of contribution, and least
amount of effort put forth and 7 indicating the most. The fourth rat-
ing (number of ideas) was also made on a 7-point scale, with 1 indi-
cating no ideas and 7 indicating many. All ratings were made pri-
vately and anonymously on absolute rather than relative scales such
that it would be possible for all members to receive ratings of 7
(highest rating).
To construct a cooperation measure for each week, participants’
evaluations of themselves were removed and the remaining evalua-
tions of each group member were averaged. This was done sepa-
rately for each of the four measures of contribution. The four mea-
sures of contribution were then averaged to form a perceived level
of cooperation index for each member (how much other group
members perceived that particular member to have contributed). A
group-level measure of perceived cooperation was then con-
structed by averaging the perceived level of cooperation indices for
each group member. Scores for Weeks 2 through 4 were averaged to
516 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / October 2000
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016sgr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
form an index of early perceptions of cooperation for each group,
and Weeks 5 through 7 were averaged to create an index of late per-
ceptions of cooperation for each group. Internal consistency across
the four scales as indicated by the alpha for standardized variables
ranged from .91 for the average of Weeks 2 through 4 to .92 for the
average of Weeks 5 to 7 questionnaires.
Other dependent measures. Other measures included a measure
of group identity and the group essay scores. The highest possible
score on the group essay was 10. The construction of the group
identity measure is described next.
The group identity measure was constructed from eight items on
the posttask questionnaire. All participants used a 7-point scale to
rate the following: how happy they were feeling during that session,
how pleased they were feeling during that session, how the group’s
interaction that day affected task performance, how the group’s
interaction that day affected morale, how the group’s interaction
that day affected interpersonal relations, what impact each member
had on group cohesiveness and morale, how positive they were
feeling about their group on that day, and how friendly they were
feeling toward other group members.
Each student’s ratings on these items were averaged to form a
measure of group identity at the individual level. Member scores
were averaged to yield a collective group identity score. Internal
consistency of this post hoc scale (as indicated by the standardized
item alpha) ranged from .91 during Weeks 2 through 4 to .86 during
Weeks 5 through 7 questionnaires. A separate study that included
both the items from this post hoc scale and the Hinkle Group Iden-
tity Scale (Hinkle et al., 1989) found a .74 correlation between the
two scales (Arrow, 1996). In addition, because the Hinkle scale fac-
tors into three subscales measuring emotional aspects of member-
ship (EMOT), tensions between individual needs and group
dynamics (IND/GP), and cognitive aspects of identification
(COG), it was possible to examine correlations between the post
hoc scale and the Hinkle subscales. All correlations between the
post hoc scale and the subscales were positive and statistically
significant. The strongest correlation was with the EMOT subscale
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(r = .83, p < .01), and the weakest correlation was with the IND/GP
subscale (r = .51, p < .01). The correlation with the COG subscale
was .61. This pattern of correlations suggests that the post hoc scale
used in both Arrow (1996) and the present study is a reasonably
valid measure of group identity.1
RESULTS
All analyses were conducted at the group level. A 2 (FTF vs.
CMC) × 2 (early vs. late) repeated measures ANOVA was con-
ducted on the group identity measure. Table 1 shows the means by
communication medium for early and late group identity scores.
No significant time or medium main effects or any interactions
were observed. Thus, for these groups, group identity did not
change noticeably over time or with the use of different communi-
cation media.2
A 2 (FTF vs. CMC) × 2 (early vs. late) repeated measures
ANOVA was conducted on perceived cooperation. A significant
time effect was obtained, F(1, 29) = 5.73, p < .05, with means indi-
cating perceived cooperation increased over time (see Table 1).
Medium did not exert any significant main effects or interactions.
Regardless of medium, perceived cooperation increased over time
in these groups.
An initial inspection of the perceived cooperation means for FTF
versus CMC groups across the early and late measurements may
lead one to conclude that the differences in perceived cooperation
over time are minimal, suggesting that the significant main effect
described earlier may be spurious. However, post hoc dependent
samples t tests conducted separately for the FTF and CMC groups
indicated that the increase over time was significant at least for
the CMC groups (t = 2.45, p < .05) although not for the FTF groups
(p > .05). That the CMC groups experienced more change over time
than their FTF counterparts is not surprising because CMC groups
studied in past research have taken longer to adjust to their novel
communication technology but eventually behave similarly to their
FTF counterparts on later performance measures (Hollingshead,
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McGrath, & O’Connor, 1994). The difference over time between
the CMC and FTF groups combined was not strong enough to
achieve global significance in the interaction term of the repeated
measures ANOVA, however.
To further investigate what might account for the significant per-
ceived cooperation main effect for time, a multiple regression anal-
ysis similar to the one in Bouas and Komorita (1996) was per-
formed. Three possible predictors of perceived cooperation in the
later time period were examined. First, early levels of group iden-
tity might predict later perceived cooperation. Although the analy-
ses reported earlier suggest that this is probably not the case, the
regression analysis provides a better test of this possibility given
the continuous nature of the group identity and perception of coop-
eration measures. Thus, early group identity was included as a
predictor.
A second predictor was early level of perceived cooperation.
Early levels of perceived cooperation are analogous to measures of
expectation of cooperation in previous research (Bouas &
Komorita, 1996). Measures of expectation of cooperation in previ-
ous research asked participants, “How many others do you think
chose J [i.e., cooperated]?” and “How many others do you think
chose P [i.e., defected]?” after participants had already made an
anonymous choice (but before they knew what other members’
choices were) in a one-shot public goods dilemma. Measures of
perceived cooperation in the present study asked participants to
evaluate contribution levels of group members after the more real-
istic public goods dilemma (i.e., group essay) was completed for
that week. Previous research has shown that expectation of cooper-
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TABLE 1: Early and Late Perceived Cooperation and Group Identity by Communi-
cation Medium
Early Late
FTF SD CMC SD FTF SD CMC SD
Perceived cooperation 5.16 .60 5.01 .63 5.25 .58 5.34 .47
Group identity 5.15 .56 4.87 .57 4.92 .44 4.85 .55
NOTE: FTF = face-to-face communication. CMC = computer-mediated communication.
For FTF groups, n = 15 groups; for CMC groups, n = 16 groups.
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016sgr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
ation arising from commitments made during discussion signifi-
cantly predicts future cooperation (Bouas & Komorita, 1996).
Thus, early perceived cooperation was included as a possible pre-
dictor of late perceived cooperation.
A third predictor included in the regression analysis was early
performance on the group essay. Allison and Kerr (1994) found that
successful groups are judged as more cooperative than unsuccess-
ful groups and that past group success tends to engender coopera-
tion in subsequent public goods dilemmas. If early performance on
the group essay can be construed as a measure of group success,
early essay performance might predict later ratings of perceived
cooperation.
When early measures of group identity, perceived cooperation,
and essay performance were regressed onto late measures of per-
ceived cooperation, a significant R2 of .39 was obtained (see Table 2).
Because a significant correlation existed between two of the pre-
dictor variables (see Table 3), the beta weights in the regression
equation were not interpretable. To understand the independent
contribution of each predictor variable, the change in R2 in going
from the full model (all three predictors included) to a restricted
model (only two predictors included) was tested for all three possi-
ble pairings of predictors. Table 2 shows that a significant change in
R2 occurred when early perceived cooperation was dropped from
the equation. When early group identity and early essay performance
were dropped from the equation, however, no significant change in
R2 was observed. These analyses suggest early perceived cooperation
is the most important predictor of late perceived cooperation and
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TABLE 2: Regression Weights and Change in R2
Measures Full Model Weights R2 F(1, 27) for R2
Intercept 2.88*
Early group identity –.03 .0009 0.04
Early perceived cooperation .55* .2803 12.37*
Early group essay –.03 .0034 0.15
NOTE: R2 for full model = .3881, F(1, 27) = 5.71, p < .005.
*p < .005.
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fail to provide evidence that group identity plays a critical role in
eliciting cooperation.
DISCUSSION
The major contribution of this study is to extend the examination
of social dilemmas into a more real-life public goods setting.
Besides permitting replication and generalization of prior labora-
tory findings, the real-life setting also permitted a more powerful
test of group identity effects. Four major differences between labo-
ratory and real-life social dilemmas were outlined: (a) Incentives
may be weaker in laboratory versus real-life dilemmas; (b) commu-
nication is more constrained in the laboratory; (c) time in the labo-
ratory refers to trial blocks within an experimental hour rather than
to more extended time periods experienced by real groups; and (d)
cooperation is objective in the laboratory but more subjective in
real-life social dilemmas. The present study was a public goods
dilemma that was more real life in terms of these four distinctions.
Participants were very motivated to attain good grades on group
essays, were able to communicate freely about any subject they
chose, met with their group members for 2 hours each week for 7
weeks, and reported perceptions of cooperation because no objec-
tive measure of cooperation was available.
These differences have important implications for the generality
of previous research on communication in social dilemmas. Previ-
ous work on communication suggests discussion of the dilemma
will increase cooperation, and commitment or expectation of coop-
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TABLE 3: Intercorrelations Between Predictor Variables
Early Group Early Perceived Early Group
Identity Cooperation Essay
Early group identity 1.00 .54* –.02
Early perceived cooperation 1.00 .15
Early group essay 1.00
*p < .005.
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eration is the critical mechanism underlying the discussion effect.
Most studies investigating this problem have been conducted in
controlled laboratory settings with ad hoc groups during the experi-
mental hour. Although these studies have contributed to our under-
standing of cooperation in social dilemmas by providing clear, pre-
cise results, little is known about their generality. The present study
extends the generality of those findings.
The differences between laboratory and real-life social dilem-
mas raised the possibility that group identity might account for
communication’s effects in more real-life social dilemma contexts
than in laboratory settings. If this were the case, then group identity
should increase over time and perceptions of cooperation should
follow that same pattern. In fact, perceptions of cooperation did sig-
nificantly increase over time in these groups, contrary to laboratory
findings about cooperation’s development (Isaac & Walker, 1988;
Komorita et al., 1992; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965). Yet, group
identity did not follow this same pattern. Rather, group identity
showed a nonsignificant decreasing trend. Regression analyses
indicated that group identity plays an insignificant role in predict-
ing later perceived cooperation. These results support the existing
body of social dilemma literature on the discussion effect in the lab-
oratory and provide additional evidence that group identity is not an
underlying mechanism of discussion’s effectiveness.
Perceptions of cooperation served as a subjective cooperation
measure in this study because an objective measure was unavail-
able. Early perceptions of cooperation were the only significant
predictor of later perceptions of cooperation. Early perceptions of
cooperation are analogous to measures of expectation of coopera-
tion in previous laboratory studies of the discussion effect (Bouas
& Komorita, 1996). The early perception of cooperation measures
in the present study asked participants to evaluate their own and
their group members’ contributions to the group essay. These mea-
sures were taken after the essay was written each week but obvi-
ously prior to the next week’s essay task. Observing one’s group
members’ contributions during one week could clearly create an
expectation for what would happen the following week.
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Bouas and Komorita (1996) found that expectations of coopera-
tion brought about by commitments made during discussion were
the best predictor of objectively measured cooperation in a labora-
tory public goods paradigm. The present study found that early per-
ceived cooperation was the best predictor of later perceived cooper-
ation. Given the conceptual correspondence between early
perceptions of cooperation and expectation of cooperation, the
present findings in the more real-life social dilemma are entirely
consistent with previous laboratory results suggesting commit-
ments that give rise to expectations of cooperation are the more
important mechanism underlying cooperation, indicating their
generality.
At least two results in the present study, however, are surprising
in light of existing literature. The first surprise was the lack of a
relation between early performance on group essay and later per-
ceptions of cooperation, as indicated by the regression analyses.
Allison and Kerr (1994) found that successful groups are perceived
to be more cooperative than unsuccessful groups and that past
group success fosters cooperation in subsequent public goods.
Yet, no relationship between early group performance on essays
and later perceived cooperation was found in the present study.
One possible explanation is that the variance on the early group
performance measure (σ2 = 1.07) was too low to detect an existing
relationship. Future research should investigate this discrepancy
further.
The second surprising result was that perceived cooperation
increased over time, especially in the CMC groups. Laboratory
research conducted within an experimental hour suggests that
cooperation should decrease over time (Komorita et al., 1992).
Whereas perceived cooperation served as a subjective cooperation
measure in the present study, it may be that it does not measure the
same thing as objective cooperation. Future research should exam-
ine the correspondence between perceived cooperation and more
objective measures of cooperation. Because some real-life social
dilemmas may not have any objective means of assessing coopera-
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tion, this correspondence may be best established in laboratory
conditions.
Although the present study did not entirely remove the social
dilemmas from the laboratory, it meaningfully moved in that direc-
tion. With respect to the four major differences between laboratory
and real-life social dilemmas outlined, the present study fell more
on the side of real-life social dilemma experiences. Future work on
social dilemmas occurring in less controlled situations should
extend the present by engaging in explicit hypothesis testing based
on the present results. If general principles of cooperation in social
dilemma settings are to be identified, research must expand beyond
the boundaries of the laboratory to include more realistic contexts.
Doing so will not take away from laboratory findings but will
strengthen those results by providing even stronger evidence of
their validity and generalizability.
NOTES
1. Some readers may be interested in the relationships among items on the group identity
scale used here. In the present study, when the post hoc group identity scale was subjected to
a principal components factor analysis using an oblique rotation, a similar factor structure
emerged across the weeks relevant to the study (Weeks 2 through 7). All weeks except for
Week 5 showed that a two-factor solution accounted for anywhere between 66% (Week 3)
and 79% (Week 4) of the variance. Six of the eight items on the scale loaded on the first factor.
The only items that loaded on the second factor were measures of how happy and how pleased
participants indicated they were feeling during the session. These were the only two items on
the scale that did not explicitly refer to feelings toward the group or its members. The most
typical correlation between these two factors was approximately .44 to .51, although during
Week 6, the correlation was as low as .20.
2. An analysis was conducted on this same measure and same data in Bouas and Arrow
(1996) that is similar enough to warrant explanation to avoid any confusion. Bouas and
Arrow conducted a 2 (face-to-face vs. computer-mediated communication) × 7 (Weeks 1
through 7) repeated measures ANOVA on the same measure of group identity in these groups
as part of a larger study of the developmental pattern of group identity. The analysis reported
here is conceptually similar except that rather than analyzing the time factor at seven differ-
ent levels (week), this analysis did not include Week 1 and collapsed Weeks 2 through 4 into
an early measure of group identity and Weeks 5 through 7 into a late measure of group
identity.
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